Comprehensive security analysis of two architectural approaches for implementing a digital signature system.
| Security Parameter | Rating | Expert Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Technical Complexity of Interception | EXTREMELY HIGH | Requires compromising a Certificate Authority or zero-day exploits |
| Time to Decrypt TLS 1.3 | 5-10+ YEARS | Modern 128-bit+ ciphers are practically unbreakable with current technology |
| Risk of Incomplete Interception | HIGH | Loss of even 1 byte of data renders all intercepted information useless |
| Selective Packet Interception | IMPOSSIBLE | Attacker cannot determine in advance which packets contain critical data |
| Practical Feasibility | 0.001% | Available only to state-level attackers with unlimited resources |
CONCLUSION: Interception and decryption of HTTPS in real-world conditions represents a theoretical threat with no practical significance for system security assessment.
| Security Criterion | Server-side Approach | Client-side Approach |
|---|---|---|
| Private Key Protection | CONDITIONAL (temporary storage) | COMPLETE (not transmitted) |
| User Data Integrity | GUARANTEED | UNCONTROLLED |
| Resistance to MITM Attacks | HIGH (HTTPS) | HIGH (HTTPS) |
| Protection Against Identity Forgery | COMPLETE | ABSENT |
| Criterion | Server-side Approach | Client-side Approach |
|---|---|---|
| Mass Compromise | MEDIUM RISK | MINIMAL |
| User Data Loss | LOW | HIGH (formatting) |
| Legal Responsibility | CONTROLLABLE | UNCONTROLLABLE |
| Third-Party Trust | HIGH | LOW |
| Functional Aspect | Server-side Approach | Client-side Approach | Explanation of Limitations |
|---|---|---|---|
| Participant Coordination | β COMPLETE | β IMPOSSIBLE | Clients cannot coordinate the process among themselves without a central server |
| Original Integrity Guarantee | β GUARANTEED | β IMPOSSIBLE | No way to guarantee all participants are signing the identical document version |
| Signature Combination | β AUTOMATIC | β MANUAL | Collecting signatures from multiple participants requires manual file merging |
| Document Version Control | β CENTRALIZED | β ABSENT | Impossible to prevent signing of outdated document versions |
| Business Process Workflow | β SUPPORTED | β IMPOSSIBLE | Complex signing chains (DirectorβAccountantβLawyer) are unfeasible |
| Legal Force of Multi-signature | β GUARANTEED | β QUESTIONABLE | Lack of process control casts doubt on legal significance |
CONCLUSION: Multi-signature is a killer-feature that architecturally requires a server component. A purely client-side implementation is impossible for practical use in business processes.
| Security Threat | Probability | Impact | Overall Risk | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Client-side: Identity Forgery | HIGH | CRITICAL | CRITICAL | 1 |
| Client-side: Multi-signature Impossibility | 100% | HIGH | CRITICAL | 1 |
| Client-side: Key Loss | MEDIUM | HIGH | HIGH | 2 |
| Server-side: Infrastructure Attack | MEDIUM | MEDIUM | MEDIUM | 3 |
| Server-side: Temporary Key Storage | LOW | MEDIUM | LOW | 4 |
| HTTPS Traffic Interception | EXTREMELY LOW | HIGH | MINIMAL | 5 |
SERVER ARCHITECTURE RECOGNIZED AS THE ONLY VIABLE OPTION FOR AN INDUSTRIAL DIGITAL SIGNATURE SYSTEM
Despite the theoretical advantages of a distributed approach, the fundamental shortcomings of client-side generation in the areas of data authenticity control and legal protection make the server-oriented architecture the only viable solution for a digital signature system intended for real commercial and legal use.
The analysis of multi-signatures revealed a critical architectural problem with the client-side approach - the impossibility of coordination between participants and guaranteeing document integrity. This makes a purely client-side implementation unsuitable for real business processes where multi-signatures (>1 signature) are necessary.